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Summary  findings
Hungarv adopted a tough new bankruptcy law in late  The first wave of reorganizations was handled
1  991 that took effect on January 1, 1992. It required  surprisingly quickly, especially considering the sheer
managers of firms with arrears over 90 days to any  number of cases, the novelty of the process, and the
creditor to file for either reorganization or liquidation  shortage of trained judges. This quickness was possible
within eight days (the so-called "automatic trigger") and  largely because of the decentralized design of the
provided a rather sympathetic framework in which to do  process. Once the court approved a case, the court had
so. The result: Since January  1992, more than 25,000  little role. (Amendments added in 1993 may have made
cases have been filed - far beyond lawmakers'  the process more bureaucratic and expensive.)
expectations.  * In this sample, major delays occurred not in
Both positive and negative views about the law have  reorganization but in liquidation. Creditors will do
beeni  expressed, hut details about how the process has  almost anything to avoid filing for liquidation, and once
actuallv worked have been scarce. Gray, Schlorke, and  firms enter liquidation they are still likely to be kept alive
Szanyi help fill this information gap by providing  indefinitely. In the end, this lack of a viable creditor-led
detailed data on a randomly selected stratified sample of  ,exit" and debt collection mechanism harms firms by
actual cases filed in 1992-93,  supplemented by  increasing the cost and reducing the flow of credit.
information gained through  interviews with judges,  Although the bankruptcy process displays some
liquidators, and firms involved in bankruptcy. They  degree of economic logic, one should not assume that it
conclude, among other things, that:  operates as a similar law would in a market economy. In
* The bankruptcy process appears to have had some  particular, a likely source of private gain in HungarT
degree of economic logic in 1992 and 1993. Better firms  appears to be asset or other value diversion (or "value-
were niore likely to enter and emerge "successfully" from  stripping") before bankruptcy.
reorganization, while worse firms were more likely either  * The main need is to strengthen the incentives of
to fail in reorganization or to file directly for liquidation.  creditors to monitor the process closely and to improve
* Judicial reorganization need not be slow and costly.  their ability to do so.
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As policy makers in transition economies look for policies and processes to spur
enterprise restructuring, they should take a close look at Hungary's experience with bankruptcy 1
reform since 1992.  It is indeed unique in the post-socialist world.  Hungary adopted a tough
new bankruptcy law in late 1991 that took effect January 1, 1992.  It required managers of all
firms with arrears over 90 days to any creditor to file for either reorganization or liquidation
within 8 days (the so-called "automatic trigger") and provided a rather sympathetic framework
for them to do so. The law immediately resulted in a wave of filings, with some 3500 filings in
April, 1992, alone (after the 90 day "grace" period covered by the law) and over 22,000  filings
in 1992-1993.  Since January 1992, over 25,000 cases have been filed under the law (Table 1), a
level far beyond the expectations of policy makers when the law was adopted.
Although the level of activity has been enormous, detailed information on how the
bankruptcy process has actually worked in Hungary has been scarce.  Many views -- both
positive and negative -- have been put forward regarding the impact of the law on enterprise
restructuring in particular and economic growth more generally, but they have been supported by
'  For purposes  of this paper we use  the term "bankruptcy"  for the entire  framework  and "reorganization"  and
"liquidation"  for the two specific  procedures  provided  in the law. This  differs  from the specific  Hungarian
terminology,  which  uses  the term "bankruptcy"  to refer to the specific  reorganization  procedure  rather  than the
broader  overall  framework.
-2  -TABLE 1
Hungarian Reorganization and Liquidation Processes
1-92 through  12-93
Reorganization  Liidatio
FILINGS  5,156  17,133
Of these:
SOEs  429  1,820
Cooperatives  965  2,768
Business Entities  3,762  12,545
(of these, limited
liability companies)  (2,959)  (8,927)
Of these, approximate %
with over 300 employees  6%  *
51-300 employees  24%  *
50 or fewer  70%  *
STATUS AS OF  12-31-93
Closed  4,627 (90%)  **
- With Ageement  1,250 (27%)
- Reversion to liquidation  1,377 (30%)
- Administration completion  2,000 (43%)
Pending  529 (10%)
*  Data not available
**  Over 10,000 liquidation cases were completed by the courts in 1992 and 1993, but these
included cases filed in earlier years under the previous law.  Furthermore,  over three-fourths
of those completed cases were "administrative completions",  i.e. cases withdrawn or rejected
on administrative grounds rather than completed on the merits.  Only a very small number of
the 17,133 cases filed in 1992 and 1993 have been completed to date.very limited reliable data. This study helps to fill this information vacuum by providing detailed
data on a randomly selected stratified sample of actual cases filed in the first two years after the
enactment of the law.  These data are supplemented with information obtained in numerous
interviews with judges, liquidators, and firms involved in the bankruptcy process to give an
overall picture of the process in practice in the first two years of its implementation.
Bankruptcy law plays at least three important roles in market economies.  First, it
provides ailing frmns  with an orderly means of exit.  Second, it helps to reallocate assets to better
uses through a combination of restructuring and liquidation. These two roles work together: The
threat of exit spurs restructuring, and the impossibility of restructuring spurs exit. The
bankruptcy process should ideally be able to discriminate between unviable firms and potentially
viable ones that can be saved through restructuring.  For enterprises able to cover operating costs
out of current revenues but unable to cover debt service, reorganization provides an avenue to
restructure debt burdens and thus continue in operation.  It may promote such restructuring
formally, as in the Hungarian reorganization procedure, or through informal debtor-creditor
workouts undertaken to avoid formal bankruptcy.  Firms unable to cover even operating costs
are clear candidates for exit unless fundamental operational restructuring can be achieved via
reorganization.
-4  -In their emphasis  on preserving  jobs and production,  policy  makers  in many  transitional
countries  focus  on these  first two roles for bankruptcy  law.  However,  a third role is at least as
important  for economic  growth:  The bankruptcy  regime  should  promote  the flow of credit in an
economy  by protecting  creditors  and serving  as a final  stage of debt  collection. A well-designed
bankruptcy  process takes  control  over financially-distressed  firms  before all assets have been
misused  or dissipated,  and it gives  creditors  the information  and power to direct the use of the
remaining  assets  to maximize  the potential  for debt  recovery  (either  by improving  the firm's
performance  via reorganization  or by liquidating  the firm and satisfying  creditors' claims  to the
extent  possible  out of sale proceeds).  By thus giving  creditors  the confidence  that debts  can be
collected,  bankruptcy  processes  (and  collateral  laws  prior to bankruptcy)  facilitate  the role of
banks and other creditors  in funding  and monitoring  investment  in an economy  and in exerting
influence  over enterprise  managers.  Without  the ability  to collect  debts, banks will either refuse
to lend  at all and thereby  become  peripheral  players  in both resource  allocation  and corporate
governance,  or they  will turn to the state for support  when loans  turn bad. Thus, bankruptcy
legislation  is an important  complement  to, not a substitute  for, disciplined  macroeconomic
policies  and privatization  (and the "hard  budget  constraints"  and corporate  governance
possibilities  they create).
Considering  these  various  roles, the major questions  to be addressed  below include  the
following:
-5  -*  What types of firms enter reorganization  and/or liquidation  in Hungary,  and why?
*  How cumbersome  are these processes  in practice?
*  What direct effects  do these  processes  have:
*  - on restructuring of problem firms?
*  - on exit of problem firms?
*  - on privatization?
*  - on institution building?
*  What are the roles of the various  actors in these  processes  (i.e. debtor managers  and owners,
creditors,  judges, liquidators/trustees),  and why?
*  Does the process  serve reasonably  well as a debt  collection  mechanism  for creditors?
*  Considering  the answers  to the above  questions,  what is the overall impact  of the process on
the economy,  and how can the process  be improved?
The Legal Framework for Hungarian Bankruptcy
The Hungarian  bankruptcy  law of 1991  replaced  earlier legislation  adopted  in 1986  and
provided  Hungary  for the first tine with a modern  legal framework,  quite similar in structure  to
the U.S. bankruptcy  regime. Debtor  finms  could  file for either reorganization  or liquidation,
- 6 -while creditors could file for liquidation only.  If debtors filed for reorganization, incumbent
management could stay in place, and the firm received automatic relief from debt service and
asset foreclosures for three months (further extendable by one month).  During this three-month
period, debtor management was supposed to develop a reorganization plan and present it to
creditors.  Unanimous approval by all creditors was required for the plan to be adopted;
otherwise the case reverted automatically to liquidation.  A firm with a successful plan could not
file again for bankruptcy for at least three years.  Trustees' and creditors' committees were not
required in reorganization cases but could be organized at the discretion of creditors.
The liquidation process provided in the 1991 law was also in line with international
norms.  It provided for a liquidator be appointed once the court reviewed and decided to proceed
with a filed case.  The liquidator was supposed to notify creditors, draw up a list of assets, sell
the assets, and divide the proceeds among creditors in order or priority (with liquidation costs
2 first, followed by creditors secured by mortgage ,  other creditors, and equity holders, in that
order).  The entire process was supposed to be completed within two years.  The law set
compensation levels for liquidation and trustees, and regulations adopted concurrently with the
law provided an annual licensing procedure for liquidators, setting out minimum capital
requirements and professional qualifications.
2  Liens other than mortgages  on real property  had no priority  over unsecured  credit.
-7-Numerous important changes were made to the law in September, 1993, drawing
ostensibly from the first one and a half years of experience with the 1991 law.  The unanimous
creditor approval requirement was considered too tough, so it was replaced by a requirement of
creditor approval by one-half in number and two-thirds in value of outstanding claims.  The
automatic three-month stay on debt service was considered too generous and easy to abuse, and it
was replaced by a discretionary stay that required the same level of creditor approval within 15
3 days from the date of filing . Liquidators' compensation was considered too low and was
increased.  To stem the unanticipated flood of cases, both the "automatic trigger" and the
automatic reversion of failed reorganizations to liquidation were eliminated.  Finally, trustees
were made mandatory in all reorganization cases.
Since the passage of the 1993 amendments, the number of reorganization cases has
declined dramatically, to a level of only about five cases per month by end-1994.  There are
several likely reasons for this decline.  First, the 1993 amendment removed both powerful
"carrots"  (the automatic stay) and powerful "sticks" (the "automatic trigger"), and the trustee
requirement increased the costs and introduced potentially undesired outside controls into the
process.4 Furthermore, end-1993 also saw the introduction of a new out-of-court workout
3  This creditor approval  requirement  made  it difficult if not impossible  in most cases for debtors  to obtain
such relief from debt service, because  creditors  would  not be likely  to approve  such moratorium  without  seeing  a
viable  reorganization  plan.
Liquidators  are licensed  by the state and  are not always  considered  by creditors  to represent  their best interests.
- 8 -process, called "debtor  consolidation",  into the Hungarian  scene. While  description  of this
process is beyond  the bounds  of this paper, 5 suffice  it to say that debtor consolidation  could well
have been seen by many  debtors and creditors  as a substitute  for reorganization  under the
bankruptcy  law.  Finally, the general  economic  conditions  of Hungary  improved  in 1994, and
many of the worst firms  may well have  already  been included  in the flood  of cases in 1992-93.
The Bankruptcy Sample
Sampnle  Selecion
To gain  insight  into many of the questions  raised above, we undertook  a survey  of  117
bankruptcy  cases  filed between  April 1992  and September  1993. All were covered  by the
unamended  1991  law. 6 They  were filed in one of three courts  -- Budapest  (where  approximately
one-third  of all Hungarian  cases  were filed in 1992-93),  Pest County,  or Debrecen  (a more rural
location). The sample  was limited  to manufacturing  firms and was stratified  both by process  and
by size (see Figure 1). With regard to process, the sample  was stratified  to favor completed
reorganizations  (63 cases)  while still  having  a substantial  number  of liquidations,  whether  cases
For a short  description,  see Baer  and Gray (1995).
6 Although  it would  have  been  nice to have  been able  to compare  the results  of the two regimes,  this would  have
meant  including  cases filed  much  more recently  (after  September,  1993),  making  it even  more  difficult  to draw
conclusions  regarding  the outcome  of the process.
-9-Figure  1
Bankruptcy Sample: 117 Cases
Liquidation
Filings  10
12  ~~~~~~~~~~Transfers  to
14 Lqidation
Transfers to  10  Large  Firms
Liquidation  * Small
Completed
Completed  36  Agreements
Agreements  27
4
Withdrawalstransferred from reorganization (28) or cases filed as liquidations (22).  (Four cases were filed as
reorganizations but withdrawn before completion.)  With regard to size, the sample was stratified
to include both small and large firms on a roughly equal basis.  Large firms were defined either
as firms taken from a list of Hungary's 603 largest loss-making firms in 19927, or as firms not
on that list but with assets worth over 100 million forint (approximately US$1.25 million in
1992).  It should be noted that because the sample of large firms was taken from the list of loss-
makers, the large firms in our study are likely to have had worse average financial performance
than a random sample of large firms that filed for bankruptcy.  Actual cases were chosen at
random, subject to these stratification criteria and to the willingness and ability of firms to
participate.8 Data for each firm were collected both from court files (on average about one-
quarter of all data) and from interviews with managers and/or liquidators.
Sector and  Ownership
Figures 2 and 3 show the resulting breakdown in the sample by sector and by ownership,
two variables not controlled in the stratification.  The sectoral distribution is broad, with
somewhat heavy representation by firms in the machinery and equipment sector.  Ownership
patterns support the prior expectation that larger firms tended to be state-owned while smaller
We wanted  to sample  heavily  from this list, which  represented  Hungary's  biggest  problem  firms., in order to
get a sense  of how the process  addressed  Hungary's  biggest  problem  firms. It we had not stratified  the sample  to
favor  large firms, a totally  random  sample  would  have  contained  overwhelmingly  small  firms.
8Approximately  40% of firms approached  for the study  agreed  to participate.
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Sectoral Distribution of 117 Firm Sample
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0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35firms tended  to be private. Table  2 shows  basic indicators  for large and small firms  at the time
of filing for bankruptcy. 9 Large and small firms  had on average  625 and 37 employees,
respectively. While  their overall  level of debt (both  long-  and short-term)  as a share  of the
reported  book value  of assets was similar  and on average  very high (146%),10  large firms tended
to have a much  larger share of bank debt and a somewhat  lower  share  of debt to suppliers  and
government. Both had a large residual  of unclassified  debt.' 1
Reasons  for Financial  Distress
Reported  external  reasons  for pre-bankruptcy  financial  distress  in small and large firms
are shown in Figure 4.12 While  firms  report a wide  range of external  reasons  for financial
distress, decline  in domestic  demand  for the products  produced  by the firms appears  to have been
9 All financial data cited in this study should be regarded as approximations. Data on assets, liabilities
(particularly residual equity), and income are particularly unlikely to be accurate given the enormous deficiencies
in accounting in the transition environment.  However, because the extent of accounting deficiencies within
individual firms is unlikely to be correlated with other independent variables used in this analysis, we believe that
the overall findings of the study (which depend on relative comparisons among different categories of firms rather
than absolute magnitudes) are unlikely to be seriously compromised by such accounting deficiencies.
10  That the firms in our sample are worse off financially than the average firm in bankruptcy is evident from a
comparison of these numbers with data on bankruptcy cases collected by the Hungarian Central  Statistical Office
(CSO).  According to the CSO data, the average debt/asset ratio of firms that filed for reorganization in 1992 was
.57, well below the average for firms in our sample. We are indebted to Prof. Mark Schaffer for providing us
with the CSO data.
In addition to credit from other parties (for example, owners or affiliated firms), some of this unclassified debt
could well be misclassified suppliers' credits -- for example, arrears to utilities.  Little of it is likely to be bank credit.
12 The results shown in Figure 4 summarize both pre-bankruptcy numerical data and subjective  judgments
reported in the questionnaire.
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0  100more important for large firms, which is not surprising given that many were state-owned firms
producing goods that were obsolete or uncompetitive in the transition environment.  Unfavorable
relative changes in output and input prices and high tax burdens appear to be somewhat more
important for smaller (mostly private) firms.  In contrast to a common impression in Hungary,
decline in exports to the CMEA, while important for both groups, was by no means the primary
reason for financial distress in this sample of firms. Of course, internal reasons for financial
distress, such as weak management or poor accounting, are also likely to be very important in
many cases but were not readily measurable in this survey.
The Bankruptcy Process in Action
What Type of Firms Enter  Reorganization  and/or Liquidation,  and  Why?
The enormous number of bankruptcy filings in April 1992 is a clear indication of the
effect of the automatic trigger that was introduced in the 1991 law.  The survey also highlights
this effect, as over 95 percent of the firms in the sample noted the trigger as the immediate
impetus for its filing.13 Under the trigger, a fimn could file for either reorganization or
13  Only six firms, all of them liquidation  cases, d.  not cite the automatic  trigger as the impetus  for filing.
The main other reason  cited was an attempt  or threat by creditors  to foreclose  on collateral  or otherwise  collect
debt.  A total of 16 firms cited this second  reason  (10 of which also  cited the automatic  trigger).
- 17 -liquidation, and one goal of the survey was to find out how firms taking these various routes (and
those succeeding or failing at the first) differ.
Figures 5 and 6 show key financial indicators at time of filing for three categories of
firms -- those who exited the reorganization process with successful agreements, those whose
reorganization cases were transformed into liquidations, and those whose cases were filed
initially as liquidations.  These figures indicate that the outcomes of the bankruptcy regime
appear to have had some degree of rationality even as early as 1992.  The debtors in the
transformed cases were in much greater debt to all types of creditors than the debtors with
accepted reorganization plans.  The former also had much greater losses than the latter.
Furthermore,  debtors in transformed cases not only had fewer assets overall, but a higher
percentage of their assets were inventories and receivables than in the case of firms with accepted
reorganizations.  The latter, in contrast, had more cash, real estate, and machinery and
equipment -- assets that are more likely to have a positive market value.
These data suggest that the reorganization process did have some success in separating
viable from unviable firms.  While undoubtedly an important conclusion, this interpretation
should nevertheless be tempered by impressions of the process gathered by the authors in outside
interviews of managers and liquidators over the past two years.  These impressions suggest two
other possible reasons for the differences between accepted and rejected reorganizations -- both
- 18 -Figure  5
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0 Large Firms  * Small Firmsof which infer that the latter were perhaps never intended to succeed.  First, the 1991 law
quickly and dramatically altered both the legal framework for bankruptcy and the responsibilities
placed on managers of bankrupt firms.  It is very likely that many managers did not immediately
understand the new law and its requirements, and thus they filed for reorganization when they
should have filed for liquidation.  Second, it is widely believed in Hungary that some managers
of state-owned firms have spun off or otherwise diverted valuable state-owned assets, whether
fixed assets, labor, or intangibles (such as contracts and goodwill), to subsidiaries or private
firms.  Furthermore, owners and/or managers of private firms can also direct valuable assets to
other uses (or foreign bank accounts), leaving only "shell" firms to enter reorganization and/or
liquidation.  In an environment with poor information and underdeveloped "watchdog"
institutions, it is exceedingly difficult to prevent such activity.  14  The extent of asset diversion is
-unknown  and impossible to measure'5, but that it has occurred on a significant scale in Hungary
is generally accepted.  16  Many of these reorganization filings may have been undertaken by
managers who had previously diverted valuable assets and were biding their time before
14  'bis  is not unique  to Hungary. Similar  value-stripping  is widely  reported  to occur in Bulgaria,  Ukraine,  and
other  transitional  economies  that have  been  slow to privatize  state assets. It can also  be widespread  in privatized
firms  if nonmanagerial  shareholders  have little  ability  to monitor  managerial  behavior  (as in Russia).
The survey  attempted  to get at the question  of pre-bankruptcy  asset diversion  by asking  numerous  and varied
questions  on the topic. Only a small  number  of frms reported  major  asset  transfers  in the three  years prior to filing.
However,  this is a variable  that  managers  may choose  to  hide and that  liquidators  may not have information  about,
and  thus significant  underreporting  is likely.
16 See, for example,  Stark  (1994).
- 21 -liquidation.'7 In sum, while some of the transformed cases may represent serious yet ultimately
unsuccessful attempts to restructure, it is the authors' belief that many represent either cases of
managerial misunderstanding or cases of pre-bankruptcy "value-diversion".
Turning to liquidations, one can see from Figures 5 and 6 that firms in liquidation also
had higher debt levels and greater losses than firms with accepted reorganization agreements, and
their assets were also more concentrated in receivables and inventories.  Again, the process
appears to have pushed the worst firms into liquidation, although again pre-filing value diversion
in both large and small -- i.e. public and private -- firms probably played some role in creating
the financial distress in certain cases.
How Cumbersome are these Processes in Practice?
The flood of bankruptcy cases filed in 1992 and 1993 undoubtedly put a strain on
Hungary's judicial institutions.  There were only eight bankruptcy judges in the Budapest court
in 1992, handling over 15,000 cases.  It is perhaps somewhat surprising, therefore, to note that
over 60% of the reorganization cases filed in 1992 were completed the same year, and that over
95% of the cases filed in 1992 and 1993 were completed by the end of 1993 (Table 1).  Survey
1  These  managers  could  have filed  directly  for liquidation,  but filing  for reorganization  first resulted  in an
automatic  three-month  delay. Such  delay  might  have  been  helpful,  for  example,  in avoiding  a subsequent
investigation  of prior asset transfers  by liquidators,  who have  the legal  right  to void  transactions  occurring  within  one
year of liquidation  filing.
- 22 -date on the average time required for various stages of the reorganization process (Table 3)
further support the conclusion that the process was not unduly slow.  The average time required
for an agreement to be finalized was approximately eight months for both large and small firms.
On average the debtors presented their reorganization proposals about six weeks after the court's
decision to proceed, or about 18 weeks after filing.  The period of negotiation between the
presentation of the first plan and the final resolution of the reorganization cases averaged another
four months.  Unsuccessful cases (particularly those involving large firms) took somewhat longer
than successful ones, although virtually all cases were completed within one year of filing.
A major reason why reorganization cases could proceed quite quickly, despite their huge
numbers, was the low level of substantive involvement by courts and trustees.  Once a case was
approved by a judge to proceed 8 (which took on average about three months, indicating the
degree of overload in the courts), the judge was no longer substantively involved.  The process
was managed by the debtor and its creditors and in this decentralized mode could proceed quite
rapidly.  It is interesting to note that in none of the 95 reorganization cases in the sample did the
parties choose to involve a trustee in the process.  This could be because of the extra expense
involved (i.e. the trustee fees), combined with the fact that trustees had to be selected from a
preapproved list that might not have corresponded to the parties trusted by the creditors.  It could
Such  approval  depended  in most  cases  on the judge's finding  that  required  information  had been  submitted  with
the filing.
- 23 -Table 3: Time Requlrements for Reoroanizatlon Cases
Completed  Cases  Transfered  All
Reorganizations  from Reorganization
to Liquidation
Average  time In days  between:  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small
Companies!" Companies'  Companies" Companies" Companies| Companies"
Filing  and  the Court  Decsion  to  80  66  107  104  87  79
Proceed  with  the  Case
Court  Decision  to Proceed  with  the
Case  and  the Submission  of the First  39  48  55  30  43  42
Reorganization  Plan
Submission  of the First  Reorganization  119  110  152  127  126  114
Plan and  the Final Court  Decision
Totaim  238  224  314  261  256  235
(1)  N=36  (2)  N27 (3)  N=9-14  (4)  N-10-13  (5)  NE-SO  (S)  N=37-43
(7)  The  toha umb'  not  an  m  atn  "dure  of  the  awrage  duration  of  One  bnuptcy pocsm,  becas the  underlying  numbw'  of  cases  chnge tm  sub-pd to Apda.also simply  reflect  the relative  passivity  of creditors  during this period (see discussion  below.)
This lack  of demand  for trustees  brings  into question  the reasonableness  of the 1993 amendment
to require a trustee in bankruptcy  cases.
The quickness  of the reorganization  process was not, however,  characteristic  of the
liquidation  cases in the sample  (see Table  4).  Only one of the 50 liquidation  cases in the sample
had been completed  by late 1994  (i.e. within the two  years required  by law). The average  time
between  filing  and the first disposition  of assets was about 13 months,  and even  this is
significantly  underestimated  because  only about one-half  of the firms  had sold any assets when
the survey  was conducted.
A major cause  for delay in the liquidation  process,  particularly  in the case of cases
originally  filed as liquidations,  was the court's slowness  in appointing  a liquidator. This step
alone took over seven  months for small cases  and almost  a year for large cases 19.  While  this
delay is perhaps  not surprising,  given  the flood  of over 10,000  liquidation  cases  in 1992  alone, it
almost  certainly  had serious  costs in some  cases  because  of the vacuum  of oversight  and the
opportunities  for further asset diversion  during that interim  period.
9  This finding  is probably  somewhat  biased  by the large share of sample  firms handled  by the Budapest
Court.  This court is thought  to be the most overloaded,  and thus the slowest, in the country.
- 25 -Table 4: Time Requirements for Liquidation Cases
Cases  Transfered  Cases  filed  All
from Reorganization  for Liquidation
to Uquidation
Averge time In days between:  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small
Companies(') Companiesm Companiesm Companies'm Companies 0 Companies"
Filing or Transfer  from Reorganization  46  179  350  225  183  200
and  the Appointment  of a Liquidator
The Appointment  of a Liquidator  and  the  14  37  35  35  24  36
Formal  Notification  of Creditors
The Formal  Notification  of Creditors  and  200  133  304  134  244  133
the first disposition  of assets
Total Time untlil  fist dislonof  260  349  689  39  451  369
(1)  N4-12  (2)  N6-14  (3)  Ne-10  (4)  N-12  (5)  N4-  22  ()  NEl-26
(7)  Theb  i lunber  n  o a  meem of  the  swros  &irion of  the  UquXidon  poes.  be  te undwsly1  nunber  of  ca  idga  frm mnb.peto  bLb-pedIt is interesting  to note that courts  took far less time to appoint  liquidators  in cases
transformed  from reorganization  (particularly  those with large firms)  than in cases  originally
filed as liquidations. This could  be because  the previous  exposure  to those firms  in the
reorganization  phase gave  the courts (and the liquidators)  the information  and incentive  to move
quickly  once the reorganization  failed. Indeed,  in the case of large companies  the total elapsed
time between initial  filing (for reorganization  ar liquidation)  and the first disposition  of assets in
a liquidation  was no longer for those  firms  that went through  reorganization  than for those that
did not.
Who is in Control  of These Processes?
A key to understanding  the likely  impact  of  bankruptcy  in Hungary  is to understand  who
controls  the two processes,  reorganization  and liquidation. The greater the control  wielded  by
one party (be it debtor or creditor)  over a process, the more likely  that process  is to benefit that
party.  In advanced  market  economies,  where information  is relatively  plentiful  and open and
where  judicial  processes  are relatively  well-developed,  bankruptcy  is typically  a fine balancing
act between  numerous  competing  interests,  all of them  quite actively  defending  their own
interests.  In transition  economies,  however,  the situation  is quite different. Information  is far
more costly, and judicial  processes  (and  even notions  of "due process" and "fiduciary
responsibility")  are far less developed. As a result, some  parties  may have  neither the means  nor
the power  to defend  their interests  effectively. Furthermore,  some  of the parties  to bankruptcy
- 27 -proceedings  may not have strong  incentives  to collect  debts aggressively. For example, state-
owned firms  or state-owned  banks may be more inclined  to turn to the state for compensation
than to pursue  debt-collection  through  official  legal  means. (Tis  is paricularly true if there is a
history  of repeated  bank recapitalizations,  as in Hungary.)
Figure 7 presents  indicators  of the relative  amount  of participation  of various  parties in
the two processes,  reorganization  and liquidation. It is clear from this data that managers  tended
to be most powerful  in reorganization  proceedings,  generally  controfling  the process, and that
liquidators  had virtually  total control  in liquidation  cases (with  managers  still often in active
roles). Banks  and other creditors  were sometimes  active, sometimes  passive,  but virtually  never
in control of either  process. Interestingly,  banks  do not appear  to have  been significantly  more
active than  other types of creditors,  whether  trade creditors  or government  creditors. Another
more general indicator  of this relative  lack of involvement  of banks (partialy  compared  with
their very active  role in bankruptcies  in advanced  market  economies)  is the very low percentage
of cases  (approximately  3 percent)  filed by banks through  1993  (Table  5).
The relative  inactivity  of creditors,  particularly  banks, is likely  to be due to several
reasons. First, creditors  in Hungary,  as in other transidon  economies,  may lack the information
and expertise  to understand  what is at stake  and actively  oversee  debtor management  and/or
liquidators.  There is certain  to be a "learning  curve" in this as in other areas  of commercial
- 28 -Figure  7
Who Controls the Bankruptcy Process
for Large Firms?
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Passive=  Active=l  Controlling=TABLE 5:  Who  Files Liquidation Cases in Hungarv?
1992  - 1993
Percentage of Petitions
filed by:
Bank Creditors  1.5%
Govenmment  Creditors
(Tax, Social Security, Customs)  13%
Other Trade Creditors,  Liquidators,
Conversions  from Bankruptcy  67.5 %
The Firm  Itself  18%
TOTAL  100.0%development  in these countries. Our cases, all of which  were filed in 1992,  were perhaps  on the
early end of that learning  curve. Second,  creditors  may  lack the incentive  to be strong  debt
collectors,  particularly  if they  are state-owned  (as all the large banks have been  until 1995 in
Hungary)  and perhaps  expect  future state assistance  (as Hungarian  banks have repeadly  received
since 1991). Third, creditors  often  express  doubt to this  day that they  can recover  anything  in
the process. While  this is understandable  in the case  of liquidation,  given  the power of
liquidators  to prolong  the process  and the priority  given to liquidation  costs over creditors'
claims (see below),  it is not clear why the bankruptcy  process  is seen  as so unfavorable  to
creditors.  Indeed, under the legislation in place in 1992, any creditor had the power to force
firms into liquidation  by refusing  to agree to the reorganization  plan (given  the unanimous
agreement  requirement  and the automatic  reversion  to liquidation),  and thus on paper the power
of creditors  was very strong. Thi  strong  formal  power  lends  further  credence  to the importance
of the first two explanatons noted  above.
The fudam  challenge  of transition  is enterprise  restructuring,  and the core question
in this research  is what effect  the Hungrian bankruptcy  process  has had on restructuring  in
Hungarian  firms. The effect on resurigw  can be direct and/or indirect. Indirectly,  the mere
fact that  bankruptcy  beame  so widespad  in 1992  probably  spurred  greater financial  discipline
- 31 -in all firms.  While evidence clearly points to improvements in financial discipline, 20 perhaps for
this as well as other reasons, this study did not attempt to assess these indirect effects.  It did
attempt to assess, however, the direct effects of the process on restructuring by studying the
contents of reorganization plans and the changes in firm behavior and performance during and
after bankruptcy (whether reorganization or liquidation).
Einancial  Reorganlation Plans
The contents of the financial reorganization plans of the 91 cases of successful and
unsuccessful (i.e. transformed) reorganizations in the sample are summarized in Figure F. The
data point to the relatively unsophisticated nature of the final plans.  The overwhehning majority
of accepted reorganization plans provided for either an extension of loan maturity (generally of
one-half to two years) and/or a write-off of debt principle, including capitalized interest arrears
(of on average about 13% in the case of bank debt and 20-30% in the case of debts to
government and suppliers).  About one-third of accepted plans provided for some partial
immediate debt repayment (of widely varying percentage amounts), while 21 % provided for a
reduction in interest rates.  Six of the 63 accepted agreements provided for debt-equity swaps by
one or more types of creditors, although there is evidence that most were never implemented.
20 See, for example, Szanyi (1994).
- 32 -aqsp jo
VW  wwAuwdaa  Wsp  ldtoM
sdums  PsJoLuI  U!  WO  !PDI  I  o  jnWuw  Wp




=nqs  utl >g  ............................. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ......f i.  i  ........... Z
:'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.:..'.E:::.........''  ..
%0
;  i  X  . f  - tB<o:  :g  <  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~%  OL
% 09
%  09
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  .'  ,E  S  -S.  m.  .. ... ..  -.  ...... ...
'-EA  :s)u~  ~  .. ,,..s...
8::':s:.:  E  E'  E  E  EESE  E EEE  E  E  ' EE>E  s  E  E:  E 'E  "  E  E  E  '  E  '
<  '  ''  '  --  " "  t  ss  E~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~........
E  E  S  ES  Es:'.-.'''  '-  'E- ' ''  ''  sEEfE"E ES' - E  S  ,E,  E  E E  ' '  - 9 $;  ' S  ;  E.....E.E..... [,EE  S  E  E  'E:  - '  .E  'E  '  S''  - E  ,E-.  #,  ,Ei--,,;-:7:i:,:  ,-Etg,,  -Ei--:  E---X...........
:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...  ......  %O
;''E,,E,,  E  E E XE,  ''  'S ':'t''  ''  ' :''  "'l''''''"''"  '''  '"-';i't'0"  '.'.  ."'........
....... ~ ~  ~  ~  S0  ................
. . .......  ......  ....  .....  .....  ...........  ..........
.u!l  n  a  ..... .......
:sXuawaasSv  uo!......................  . ..  .. alo
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agreements for small firms contained fewer concessions than agreements for large firms, perhaps
not surprising given their less onerous financial condition at the time of filing.
It is clear from Figure 8 that proposed plans in unsuccessful reorganizations (ie. those
transformed into liquidations) contained fewer provisions overall than plans in successful cases.
However, if a provision was included, its magnitude was often greater than in the case of
successful agreements.  The paucity of provisions further supports the conclusion discussed
earlier that many of these cases were not filed with the intention to succeed in the first place.
The relatively higher magnitudes when provisions were proposed may point to the likely absence
of serious negotiations in many rejected cases.
Operational Reorganization
Most of the firms in the survey agreed or undertook steps to downsize during the
reorganization period, as indicated in Figure 9.  Whether or not formally included in the
reorganization plan22, almost two-thirds of all firms with successful plans agreed or undertook
The absence of new  credit is not surprising,, given that the Hungarian law gives no priority to such fmancing.
In contrast, financing during reorganization is granted top priority under the U.S. Chapter 11 procedure.  However,
the situation  may not be entirely analogous, as there are much tighter controls on asset disposition and cash flow
under Chapter 11 than in the Hungarian case.
22  Although the operational changes were reported in the survey questionnaires  to be part of the reorganization
plans, it is likely that in many cases they were undertaken simultaneously  but were not formally included in the plan.
- 34 -Figure  9
Operational  Restructuring  during  Reorganization
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directors  %  * Transfers to Liquidationsteps to reduce  employment  (typically  by one-quarter  to one-third)  and almost  one-third  agreed
23 or undertook  steps to sell assets or parts of the.firm.  Only 6% agreed  or undertook  steps to
change  top management,  and only 3  % (or 2 out of 63 firms) committed  to new investments  or
changes  in the membership  of the companies'  oversight  board of directors.
As in the case  of financial  plans, the operational  restructuring  plans were far less
ambitious  in the cases  of unsuccessful  reorganization,  with fewer  than  one-half  as many firms
committing  to or undertaking  changes  as in the group with successful  outcomes. Again, this is
likely  in part to reflect less commitment  to real restructuring  (and in some  cases  greater pre-
bankruptcy  value-diversion)  in this subset  of finrns.
In sum, analysis  of the reorganization  plans  of firms  that successfully  emerged  from
Hungary's reorganization  process  indicate  that they had significant,  albeit  rather unsophisticated,
content. They were primarily  focussed  on short-term  debt relief and continued  downsizing,  and
generally  did not envision  new investment,  new management  or innovation.
23 The bankruptcy  filing was not necessarily  the primary reason  for such downsizing  in all cases.  Many  of the
firms were already  downsizing  before bankruptcy  and may well have continued  in any case.  At a minimum,
however,  it is clear that bankruptcy  did not provide  a 'safety valve" to stop downsizing,  and it may well have
provided  an impetus  to begin or continue  the process in many cases.
- 36 -Outcomes  of the Reorganizaktion  Process  to Date
What happened  to the firms that emerged  from the reorganization  process  with agreed
plans? Outcomes  to mid-1994  are shown  in Table  6.  Over 90% of the firms  -- 89% of the large
ones and 96% of the small ones -- were still in operation in mid-1994.  The large firms have
made greater changes  than the small  ones since  emergence  from reorganization,  which  perhaps
reflects their worse starting  position. Over 70% of large finms  report having  significantly
reduced  employment,  40% having  sold major assets, and 34% having  changed  top management.
Only about one in seven,  however,  report having  made  major changes  in production  profile,
having  made new investments,  or having  had access  to new bank credits. About  one-half  report
improved  financial  performance,  and about  one-third  expect  to make a profit in 1994. However,
another third expect  to have  to file for reorganization  or liquidation  again in 1994  or 1995.24
If one looks at the reported reasons  for improved  performance  in firms  reporting  overall
improvement,  the major reasons  are higher sales and reduced  input costs. Lower interest
payments  are relatively  unimportant  despite  the financial  reorganization  agreements. Perhaps
these finrs reduced  debt liabilities  but not necessarily  actual  debt service, if they  were previously
unable to service  all of their debt. Although  relative  magnitudes  are similar for small firms, the
overall  percentage  of firms  that report change  is about  one-half  that of large firms. Yet their
24 Some  Hungarian  officials  fear a second  wave of bankruptcy  filings  as firms  previously  in reorganization  (in
1992  and 1993)  pass the two-year  minimum  period  before  refiling.
- 37 -TABLE  6




Percentage  of firms that are still in operation
Restructuing:  Percentage of firms that  have:
-made new investments  14  7
-soW major assets  40  11
-had access to new bank credit  17  11
-canged  top management  34  26
-significantly  reduced employment  71  48
-made major changes in production profile  14  7
Financial Performance:  Percentage of firms that:
-have improved  financial  performance  49  63
-expect to make a profit in 1994  31  63
-anticipate  having  to file for bankruptcy  or liquidation  again in  31  11
1994 or 1995
Of frms  that have improved their  fiancial  performance,  percentage reporting:
-more favorable  price structure for outputs and inputs  5  15
-higher sales volume  74  40
-lower interest payments  16  0
-improved repayment rate on receivables  37  35
-improved  inventory management  74  55
-reduced  material expenses  74  40
-reduced wage bill  37  40financial  performance  is somewhat  stronger,  probably  reflecting  their less serious  financial
distress  pre-bankruptcy.
In sum, post-reorganization  performance  appears  to be primarily  a story of belt-tightening
combined  in many cases  with higher sales volume  and better  financial  performance. Innovative
restructuring  appears  rare, as indicated  by the low  percentage  of firms that report major changes
in production  profile. Yet perhaps  two-thirds  of the firms  that entered the process expect  to
survive, and one-third  are reportedly  already  profitable. Taken  together  with the institutional
strengthening  engendered  by the process, this is arguably  a story of real albeit  perhaps  modest
success.
What is the Direct Effect of the Liquidation Process on Enterprise Exit?
The original  design  of the bankruptcy  law was envisioned  as providing  two avenues  for
ailing  firms: reorganization  and liquidation. However,  it is clear both from the results of this
study and from numerous  discussions  with liquidators  and other involved  parties  that the
liquidation  process does not necessarily  result in exit.  Of the 50 cases  of liquidation  in our
sample  (including  22 originally  filed  as liquidations  and 28 transfered  from reorganization),  only
one case (that of a small  firm) had been completed  by mid-1994.  About  40 percent  of the firms
in our sample  are still in operation  as going concerns  some  two years after the original  filing  date
(Table  7), and the great majority  of these have  remained  under the same  management  as existed
- 39 -TABLE 7
OUTCOMES  OF LIQUIDATION TO DATE
Tansfers  from  liquidation
Reorganization  JDings
._______________________________________  _  0  Large  Small  Large  Small
Total number  of firms  14'  14'  102  12
Percentage  of firms operating as a going concern  57%  23%  40%  33%
during liquidation
Percentage  of firms remaining  under existing  44%  11%  30%  29%
management after liquidation filing
Percentage  of claims expected to be recovered  by:
Workers  100%  60%  62%  64%3
Secured  creditors  4.6%  41%  23%  26%3
Unsecured creditors  17%  2%  9%  6%3
Percentage  of workers maintaining  jobs with  36%  11%  36%  33%
subsequent user of assets  .
IN  - 8-11 for most answers  due to missing values.
2 N - 8-10
3 N  - 5-6in the firm pre-filing.  Larger firms (particularly  those  transferred  from bankruptcy)  are more
likely  to remain  in operation  than smaller  firms. Furthermore,  the overall percentage  of workers
expected  to maintain  jobs with the subsequent  users of assets is about one-third  for larger firms
and slightly  less for smaller ones.
In essence, there appear  essentially  to be three broad types  of firms involved  in the
liquidation  process: "shell" companies,  which  have few if any assets when liquidation  is filed;
small firms (mostly  private),  which  are quite easy to liquidate  and thus are often closed  quickly;
and larger firms (mostly  state-owned)  with significant  assets, which  are rarely closed completely
during a liquidation  proceeding.
Why do so many firms  continue  in operation  during the liquidation  process, despite  the
fact  that it was originally  designed  as an exit process? Data from the survey  and from related
interviews  support  the view that liquidators  in large part see their role as restructurers  and
privatizers,  rather than as simply  liquidators. They work  closely  with the management  of the
debtor firm, and they  try to find purchasers  of the companies  in whole  or in part, while
preserving  as many  jobs as possible. One  reason why  this strategy  is so common  is the structure
of compensation  for liquidators. As long as the firm continues  in operation,  the liquidator  is
entitled  to a fee of 2 percent  of gross receipts;  if assets are sold, liquidators  are entitled  to 5
percent of the sales price. Furthermore,  the costs of liquidation  include  any costs incurred  to
- 41 -keep debtor firms going  during  the liquidation  process. The costs many include,  for example,  the
fees of consultants  hired to assist  the liquidator.  These costs  have top priority, even  above
secured  mortgage  liens. Clearly  there are financial  incentives  for liquidators  to keep some  firms
in operation.
While  it is perhaps  good news  for some  Hungarian  workers  and some  parts of the
Hungarian  economy  that the liquidation  "wave" has not led to more forced  exit of firms,  it is not
necessarily  good news  for creditors  or for firms  seeking  credit. Creditors  report that they have
very little influence  over the decisions  of liquidators. Although  the percentage  of claims
reportedly  expected  to be recovered  by creditors  (see Table  7) is not low by international
standards  (although  expectations  are likely  to overstate  eventual  recoveries  in these cases),  banks
generally  claim in interviews  that they expect  in reality to recover very little, and that they  expect
any recoveries  to be delayed  by years while  the liquidator  negotiates  as painless  a restructuring
and sale as possible.
It is interesting  to note that, although  the number  of reorganization  cases  has dropped
dramatically  since  late 1993, "reorganizations"  are indeed  still  occurring,  but through  the
liquidation  process. This has indeed  become  a major route for the restructuring  of problem  state-
owned  firms in Hungary. What  the system  lacks is an efficient  and dependable  exit  process that
creditors  can rely on as afinal stage  in debt collection. The weakness  of exit, together  with the
- 42 -problems  of foreclosure  on collateral  at earlier stages  of the debt  collection  process, almost
certainly  raises the cost of credit in Hungary.
What is the Effect of Bankrupty  on Privatiz2fion snd Institution Buildin?
privatization. Although  bankruptcy  may not be an efficient  exit mechanism  for firms in
their entirety, it is an important  avenue  for privatization  and "recombination" 25 of existing  assets
in the economy,  either  as parts of firms as going  concerns  or merely  as individual  assets.
Indeed,  the bankruptcy  law has probably  been one of the main stimulants  of privatization  in the
Hungarian  economy  since 1992. Not only do the formal  processes  of reorganization  and
liquidation  involve  significant  sales of assets,  but the mere existence  of these processes  creates
incentives  for managers  to spin off valuable  assets  into new entities  (often  partially  or wholly
26 privately  owned)  while leaving  liabilities  in problem  firms  to enter bankruptcy.  Furthermore,
in the case of state-owned  firms the liquidation  process  to date appears  to be as much a
privatization  process  as an exit one, as liquidators  put enormous  efforts into finding  private
buyers  for viable  parts of these  firms.
25 This concept  is taken  from Stark (1994).
26 See Stark (1994) for in-depth  discussion.
- 43 -Institution Buildinr.  Perhaps most important of all has been the impact of the bankruptcy
process on institutional development in Hungary.  The process has stimulated the development of
a cadre of professional trustees and liquidators with in-depth knowledge of techniques of
financial and organizational restructuring.  Hungary has been willing to licence both foreign and
domestic firms as liquidators, and the foreign participation has brought outside knowledge and
expertise into the picture.  It has also led to an increase in the number and commercial expertise
of judges and in the sophistication of the banks' understanding and approach to debt collection.
Such"learning by doing", even if it is fraught with problems and mistakes in the early stages,
may be the only way to build these important institutions of a market economy.
Conclusion
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the data and discussion presented above.
First, the bankruptcy process appears to have had some degree of economic logic in 1992 and
1993.  Better firms were more likely to enter and emerge "successfully" from the reorganization
process, while worse firms were more likely to either fail in the reorganization process or file
straight for liquidation.  Furthermore, although the reorganization plans and related negotiations
between debtors and creditors were not anywhere near as sophisticated as one would find in
advanced market economies, they did appear to address the core issues of debt restructuring,
-44 -debt relief, and operational downsizing.  This was not a meaningless exercise with economically
irrational or counterproductive results, nor did it result in the immediate forced closure of
potentially viable firms.  Given that Hungary's bankruptcy experiment was the first of its kind in
the transition world,  one can perhaps interpret this as a modest success.
Second, the experiment also supports the view that judicial reorganization need not be
slow and costly.  The first "wave" of reorganizations was handled surprisingly quickly,
particularly considering the sheer number of cases, the novelty of the process, and the shortage
of trained judges.  This relative quickness is largely attributable to the decentralized design of the
process.  Once a case was approved by the court to proceed, the court had little role.  The strict
thne limits laid out in the law also probably helped in assuring a relatively speedy resolution of
cases.
With regard to speed and cost, it is very possible that the amendments in 1993 took a turn
in the wrong direction in requiring the appointment of a trustee (chosen from the list of licenced
liquidators) in all bankruptcy cases. Such requirement makes the process more bureaucratic and
expensive.  If creditors believe a trustee will help represent their interests, they should be given
the option of appointing one (as provided in the 1991 law), but this need not be a requirement.
Indeed, if the creditors are not motivated to look after their interests, it is unlikely that a trustee
will do it for them effectively.
- 45 -Third, the major delays in the process in our sample occured not in reorganization but
rather in liquidation.  Much of this delay is attributable to slowness in the appointment of
liquidators to cases, and this leads to significant opportunities for asset diversion, as discussed
below.  However, some of the delay is also attributable to the fact that liquidation is to a large
extent perceived by all parties more as reorganization than as pure liquidation.  This has
become even more true since late-1993, when the number of reorganization cases began a steep
decline -- i.e. when liquidation appears in effect to have replaced reorganization as the primary
restructuring process.  Interviews with liquidators and firms confirm the view that many if not
most liquidators see themselves as active restructurers, representing first of all the interests of
employees or the public rather than the interests of creditors.  Virtually all "real" firms (as
opposed to "shells" or firms with minimal assets, of which there are plenty) stay alive during
the liquidation process as the liquidator looks for ways to privatize their viable parts.  While
this may be good for restructuring and privatization, it is not necessarily good for creditors,
who appear to feel powerless and unrepresented.  It is no wonder that creditors will do almost
anything to avoid filing for liquidation.  In the end, this lack of a viable creditor-led "exit"  and
debt collection mechanism harms firms, because it increases the cost and reduces the flow of
credit in the economy.
- 46 -It was noted earlier that one important reason that liquidators take their time is the
structure of their fees. The Hungarian government should consider a change in the fee
structure so that liquidators'  fees consist only of a fixed percentage (whether 5 % or another
figure) of proceeds from the final sale of assets.  This rather simple change could have a major
impact on the process,  speeding it up without sacrificing the incentive to save viable going
concerns, and better aligning the interests of the liquidators with those of the creditors.
Fourth, although the bankruptcy process does display economic logic, one should not
assume that it operates as a similar law would in a market economy.  The incentives of creditors
to pursue debt collection aggressively are not yet as strong as in advanced market economies.  In
the case of banks, for example, these incentives have been compromised by success bank
recapitalizations, which have encouraged banks to turn to the state for assistance rather than
27 depending primarily on the pursuit of problem debtors.  Not only are creditor incentives
somewhat weak, but the "watchdog" institutions that one takes for granted in advanced market
economies--such as accountants, lawyers, judges and other court personnel, credit rating
services, bailiffs--are still in their infancy.  Thus, creditors find it extremely difficult to gather
the information with which to defend their interests even if they are motivated to do so.  The
result is that bankruptcy processes (and what happens immediately before them) appear to be
B  Baer  and Gray (1995).
- 47 -controlled  to a far greater  extent  by debtor management  in Hungary  than in advanced  market
economies.
What does such managerial  control  imply  for the outcome  of the bankruptcy  process? In
essence, it implies  that these  managers  and to some  extent  the debtor  firms they manage  will gain
more than they would if the process  were better  monitored  and controlled  by creditors. A likely
source  of gain in Hungary  appears  to be asset or other value  diversion  (or "value-stripping  ")
prior to bankruptcy. Valuable  assets are transferred  to separate  firms  prior to filing (and the
records disappear  so the transfers  are not later traceable  by creditors,  trustees, or liquidators),
leaving  the less  valuable  assets  and the liabilities  to enter the bankruptcy  process. Interviews
undertaken  by the authors  indicate  that such  asset diversion  may  be quite common,  for both state-
owned and private fms,  although the survey was unable to capture this phenomenon on a wide
scale (which is not surprising,  given  the secretive  nature  of such transfers). Creditors  can also
be involved  in asset diversion,  by colluding  with the debtor firm to transfer  assets and thus repay
that particular  creditor  prior to bankruptcy  at the expense  of other creditors. In advanced  market
economies,  such transfers  in anticipation  of bankruptcy  are void or voidable  by the trustee. They
are by law also voidable  in Hungary,  but liquidators  report tremendous  difficulty  obtaining
necessary  evidence,  due in large part to the underdevelopment  of the "watchdog" institutions.
- 48 -It is not easy to control asset diversion, but certain policy steps can certainly help.  The
major need is to strengthen the incentives of creditors to monitor the process closely, and to
improve their capacity to do so.  These can be assisted in the short- to medium-run through:
*  changes in collateral and bankruptcy laws to put secured creditors clearly first in
priority of recovery (even above costs of the proceedings) 28;
*  streamlining of court and bailiffs' procedures to lower the costs of foreclosure on
collateral;
*  changes in the compensation of liquidators (as described above) to align their
incentives clearly with those of the creditors;
*  changes in bankruptcy regulations to require the appointment of a liquidator
immediately after a case is filed, to eliminate the long period between filing and approval
during which incentives for value diversion are at their peak;
*  stronger banking reforms and privatization to reduce bank ties to the state (and thus
the expectation of  state subsidies);
*  stronger macroeconomic discipline and enterprise privatization to reinforce the
incentives of trade creditors to actively pursue collection of their debts; and
28  A step in the wrong direction was Law No. 53,  adopted in September 1994, that placed all government
liens ahead of secured credit in priority of recoveries in cases of asset foreclosure.
- 49 -*  avoidance of any future "loan consolidation" programs, and elimination of the
"debtor consolidation" program and any other informal workout processes that may be
seen as back-door avenues for state subsidization of debtors or creditors.
Finally and more generally, one must recognize that developing the institutions of a
market economy, particularly the "watchdog" institutions referred to earlier, is a massive task
and necessarily takes time.  It will be greatly facilitated, however, if tight macroeconomic
discipline leads to "hard budget constraints", and thus firms and banks demand these institutions
because they no longer view the state as their automatic safety net in times of financial distress.
Hungary's early experiment with bankruptcy reform has made an impressive start at developing
the institutions.  It should not be discarded but rather should be strengthened through strong and
broad complementary reforms toward a market economy.
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